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LOCALISM TO BROADCAST
RESTORING
COMMUNICATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

WGN Radio in Chicago recently decided to cancel "The Noon
Show," a daily agricultural program about com futures, after
nearly fifty years on the air. When Orion Samuelson, the seventyyear-old host of show was asked to comment about the
cancellation, he said: "I understand that there's a lot of pressure
from owners to go where the money is. But it makes you wonder
about serving the local market and diversity in what you hear."'
Samuelson's comments echo the concerns on the part of many
Americans that media consolidation has gone too far.' The first
wave of media consolidation occurred in the late 1990s as a result
of passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.3 For example,
today there are 34% fewer radio station owners than there were
before the 1996 Act.4 In June 2003, as a result of its 2002 biennial
review of media ownership rules, the FCC encouraged further
consolidation in television by lifting the national ownership cap
from 35% to 45% as well as relaxing the cross-media ownership
rules. Out of the 250 page Order, about 5 pages are devoted to
1. Leon Lazaroff, Farm Radio's Frequency Fading Away, CHI. TRIB., Jan.

21, 2004, at Cl. Samuelson received more than 560 emails from disappointed
listeners. Id. Interestingly, about 40% of these comments were from listeners in
the Chicago metropolitan area. Id.
2. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, 13624 (2003).
The FCC received more than 500,000 letters and comments from individual
citizens on the ownership review proceedings. "These individual commenters
expressed concerns about the potential consequences of media consolidation,
including concerns that such consolidation would result in a significant loss of
viewpoint diversity and affect competition." Id.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
4. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, When Corporate Media Giants Call the Shots:
How New FCC Rules Will Squeeze Out Community, 13 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY Q. 34, 39 (2003).

5. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13767, 13808,
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localism, the policy that requires broadcasters to be responsive to
the needs of their broadcast communities. In addition, the FCC's
Media Ownership Working Group conducted a study to evaluate
local television news and public affairs programming.6 The study
praised the performance of network owned and operated stations
over network affiliates or unaffiliated stations.7
These actions led to a huge backlash - Americans filed hundreds
of thousands of complaints with the FCC.8 They held protests in
twelve different U.S. cities, including one in Los Angeles in front
of media conglomerate Clear Channel's headquarters.'
North
Dakota Senator Byron Dorgan led the Senate in passing a bill that
would undo the Commission's rule changes, and is now trying to
secure approval from the House."1
The FCC responded to the backlash by assembling a Localism
Task Force to take public comments and schedule hearings in
various cities continuing through the summer of 2004 to study the
quantity and quality of local news coverage." It is unclear what
impact, if any, the Task Force will have in making broadcasters
more responsive to their local communities for two reasons. First,
the FCC has not opened an official rulemaking proceeding on
localism, so it is unlikely that the efforts of the Task Force will
result in regulatory changes in broadcasting. Second, many
13843 (2003). Cross-ownership refers to a single owner of different types of
media in the same market, for example, common ownership of a radio station
and a newspaper.
6. THOMAS C. SPAVINS, LORETTA DENISON, SCOTT ROBERTS, JANE
FRENETTE, FCC MEDIA OWNERSHIP WORKING GROUP, THE MEASUREMENT OF
LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING, (2002).
7. Id. at 6.
8. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13624.
9. Steve Barnett, Hurrahfor Jowell as She Puts Brakes on Big Media, THE
OBSERVER,

June 29, 2003, at 6.

10. Bill McConnell, Senate Anti-Dereg Warrior Vows to Fight On; The
North Dakota Democrat Talks About His Battle to Overturn the FCC's New
Rules and Why it's Important, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, Nov. 10, 2003, at
42.
11. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Powell Launches "Localism in
Broadcasting" Initiative (August 20, 2003).
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panelists are network affiliated TV and radio broadcasters or
representatives from large media companies whose statements at
the hearings tend to be self-congratulatory." Thus, the Localism
Task Force might be little more than political posturing by a
Commission taken by surprise at the public outcry last summer
over the results of the 2002 Biennial Review of media ownership
rules.
There are four negative effects of media consolidation: less
diversity in small to medium-sized markets, unresponsiveness
during emergencies, playlist overlap and misleading programming.
A brief explanation of each of these effects is helpful to understand
why concentration is no longer a theoretical worry, but an actual
problem today.
First, consolidation's harms are more pronounced in small- to
medium-sized markets, where the number of broadcast owners in
an area has decreased drastically over the last few years. In these
markets, size necessarily limits broadcast outlets to begin with
because there are not enough listeners and advertisers to support
more than a handful of stations. Conglomerates such as Clear
Channel (which owns 1,200 stations) and Cumulus Media, Inc.
(which owns about 300 stations) 3 specifically target these markets
because they are "less competitive, have fewer signals ...and
offer substantial opportunities for further consolidation."' 4 The
effects of this purchasing strategy are startling. In Minot, North
Dakota, Clear Channel owns 6 of the 81' commercial radio
stations; in Mansfield, Ohio, Clear Channel owns 11 of the 17
radio stations that broadcast in the area; in Albany, Georgia,

12. See FCC Field Hearing on Broadcast Localism (October 22, 2003)
(statement of panelist Jim Keeler, President and COO of Liberty Corporation,
and statement of panelist Debbie Kwei, General Manager of WCHH).
13. JOHN DUNBAR AND ARON PILHOFER, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, BIG
RADIO RULES IN SMALL MARKETS: A FEW BEHEMOTHS DOMINATE MEDIUMSIZED
CITIES
THROUGHOUT
THE
U.S.
(2003),
available at
www.publicintegrity.org/telecom (last visited March 20, 2004).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Cumulus owns 8 of 15 stations. 6 Overall, Clear Channel owns
more than half of the radio stations in many of small- to mediumsized markets.17 Put another way, there are only 3 broadcast voices
in Minot (even though there are 8 radio stations) as a result of
consolidation in that market. Thus, this trend of increased
consolidation in small- to medium-sized markets is problematic
because fewer media owners results in decreased broadcast
diversity.
Second, companies like Clear Channel and Cumulus run their
stations in a way that does not require local DJs or local managers,
which renders the stations unresponsive to their broadcast
communities, particularly during emergencies. The most notorious
illustration is a chemical spill that occurred January 18, 2002 in
Minot, North Dakota. Officials from the National Transportation
and Safety Board tried repeatedly to contact KCJB-AM18 (a Clear
Channel station 9 which was the designated emergency response
station °) to warn residents not to leave their homes or open
windows. No one answered the calls. A similar example comes
from the Mansfield, Ohio area, where only 1 of the area's 17
stations aired weather reports and put callers on the air during
severe weather during spring of 2002. One would think it would
be easy for a station to broadcast a warning in response to a call
from a listener or safety authority: when the station receives a call,
there is little material to prepare (nothing to write or research, no
one to interview) and the message to be broadcast over the
airwaves is short. All a station needs to issue these safety
warnings is someone to answer the phone and make an on-air
announcement.
Yet, these examples illustrate that many
broadcasters choose not to take minimal steps to make sure basic
safety-related announcements will be broadcast.
If local
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. SURVIVAL

FACTORS

GROUP,

NAT'L

TRANSP.

SAFETY

BOARD,

(June 12, 2002).
19. See Dunbar, supra note 13.
20. See Survival Factors, supra note 18.
21. See Dunbar, supra note 13.

CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
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broadcasters do not air basic safety messages, how can they be
expected to be responsive to the community in other ways?
Third, programming practices such as "voicetracking" used by
large media companies are misleading if not deceptive.
"Voicetracking" means that a DJ in one place records news,
weather and call-ins for up to 30 stations nationwide, 2 such that
listeners are led to believe that the station is taking calls and
reporting news and weather reports produced locally. The practice
has been referred to as "fake radio. 23 Senator Dorgan calls
voicetracking "antithetical to everything that represents
localism. '24 He feels that by relaxing the ownership rules, the FCC
has created a "device that tells distant owners to pretend they are
local. 25 Current FCC rules do not limit or prohibit voicetracking,
nor has the FCC ever stated that the practice is misleading to
consumers, so it will most likely continue until the FCC decides to
regulate it.
Finally, consolidation has also led to decreased program
diversity and increased playlist overlap, according to a study
conducted by the Future of Music Coalition. 26 The study shows
that playlist overlap on stations with different formats can be as
high as 76%.27 Consequently, there is less diversity in music
because of greater song repetition over the airwaves.2 ' At the same
time, it has become very difficult for musicians to get their songs
on the radio.29 For example, Tift Merritt, a rising country music
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Polakow-Suransky, supra note 4, at 39.
Polakow-Suransky, supra note 4, at 39
McConnell, supra note 10, at 42.
McConnell, supra note 10, at 42
PETER DICOLA AND KRISTIN THOMSON, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION,

4 (Ric Duke
& Gillian Thomson, eds., 2002).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7. The FMC study found that "80-100% of radio charts are
dominated by songs released by the five major label conglomerates. This "twin
bottleneck [of greater song repetition and the fact that most of those songs are
released by five major labels] makes access to the airwaves even more difficult
for musicians [not represented by those labels] - and reduces choice for
RADIO DEREGULATION: HAS IT SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS?
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star from Raleigh, North Carolina, had extreme difficulty getting
her songs on her hometown radio stations despite numerous
requests from local fans and successful album sales in the area."
By engaging in the business and programming practices
described above, large media companies disregard local interests
and violate the policy of localism. Localism, the policy that
requires licensees to respond to their communities' local needs and
interests, is an important FCC policy central to the foundation of
broadcast regulation.3 The FCC has never officially defined the
term, but localism can have several different meanings. Localism
can refer to local ownership, management and staff presence. It
can refer to local programming such as news and community
interest programs.
Localism can also mean entertainment
programming geared toward the cultural or ethnic groups within a
community. However one chooses to think about serving local
interests, the various rules the Commission has implemented over
the years to promote localism can be placed into one of two
categories: structural rules and content rules.
Part II of this comment reviews the various regulatory tools the
FCC has used to achieve structural and content localism.
Structural rules respond to the geographic conception of localism,
including rules governing studio location, staffing and ownership
controls. These rules were meant to indirectly achieve localism on
the premise that locally owned and operated stations or local staff
are more likely to know what the local community needs are and
respond to them. Program content requirements, on the other
hand, refer to localism in programming, and were meant to achieve
localism as a direct result of the regulation. The FCC has used
both of these types of regulations over the years to achieve
localism with varying degrees of success (most of these rules have
been repealed), and a great deal of criticism.32
citizens." Id.
30. FCC Field Hearing in Charlotte,North Carolinaon BroadcastLocalism
(2003) (statement of panelist Tift Merritt, Singer-Songwriter), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/localism/documents.html (last visited April 11, 2004).
31. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13643-45.
32. E.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., REGULATING
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Part III discusses ways to achieve greater localism, with
particular emphasis on Low Power FM Radio (LPFM). LPFM
stations are small radio stations with a broadcast radius of 1-5
miles. They are generally cost less to build and maintain than fullpower radio stations. There is room on the broadcast spectrum for
hundreds if not thousands of LPFM stations. These inherently
local stations have great potential to provide listeners with
meaningful alternatives to the conglomerate-controlled full-power
stations. The FCC created LPFM service in 2000, but after heavy
lobbying by broadcasters, Congress imposed prohibitively high
interference protections that essentially barred many prospective
LPFM stations from coming into existence. Part III concludes first
that revisiting past FCC rules and tailoring them to fit
contemporary needs could be a worthwhile way to make fullpower broadcasters more responsive to their local communities. In
addition, structural and content localism can be achieved by
enhancing the LPFM service by adjusting interference rules and
allowing stations to be commercial. LPFM stations would also
push large conglomerates to be more responsive to community
needs through competition for listeners.
II. TRACING LOCALISM
The broadcast licensing system in the United States is based on
the premise that broadcast service should be local. From the
beginning, radio service in the United States was allocated into
various geographic zones.33

Congress'

authority to regulate

broadcasting is based on the scarcity doctrine, the idea that the
broadcast

spectrum

is

BROADCAST PROGRAMMING,

a

scarce

resource.34

Government

The MIT Press and The AEI Press, Cambridge,

MA (1994) 2; Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay
for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 938 (1998); David M. Silverman & David
N. Tobenkin, The FCC's Main Studio Rule: Achieving Little for Localism at a
Great Cost to Broadcasters,53 FED. COMM. L.J. 469, 492-95 (2001).

33. Radio Act of 1927, 45 Stat. 373 (1928).
34. Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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intervention was required in order to ensure efficient use of a finite
number of frequencies.35 When Congress was deciding how to
structure the radio system, it could have adopted the European
approach, in which the government licensed radio stations that
36
were powerful enough to reach across the entire country.
Instead, the Commission chose to adopt an allocation scheme for
radio service "in which every broadcast station is assigned to a
community of license with a primary obligation to serve that
community. '37 Thus, radio was intended by Congress to be
inherently local by design.
Another example of how localism is built into the foundation of
our broadcast system is public television and radio station
38
structure. In 1967, Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act
that allocated over $30 million to build educational television
broadcasting facilities and noncommercial educational radio
facilities. 9 It also created the Educational Broadcast Corporation,
a nonprofit corporation to assist in program development and
availability.4" Congress designed the program so that each state
could apply for funding and have its own educational public
facilities." Again, Congress could have created one or more
national stations that simulcast identical programming in each
state. Instead, it chose to create a decentralized but interconnected
network of public television and radio stations located in each
state.42 Congress found that creation of this service promoted
"noncommercial educational radio and television broadcast
35. Radio Act, supra note 33.
36. It is technologically feasible to have a radio station strong enough to
reach across a region (such as the Midwest or eastern seaboard) or even the
entire country.
37. Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the Commission's
Rules, the Main Studio and Program Origination Rules for Radio and Television
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3215 (1987).
38. PUB. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 367.
41. Id.

42. Comments of the Association of Public Television Stations, Localism
Task Force, RM- 10803, (filed February 4, 2004).
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programming which will be responsive to the interests of people
both in particular localities and throughout the United States."43
Today, there are 357 local public television stations which are
operated by local educational institutions and state commissions."
In addition to creating a broadcast system inherently local by
design, Congress and the FCC have also imposed (at different
times) various structural and program content controls on
individual stations to complement this design.
A. Content Regulation
In the same way that the FCC aims to maximize the benefits of
group ownership while preventing undue concentration in
ownership rules, the Commission balanced its need to evaluate
programming against licensee's program choice discretion in the
content guidelines. The notion that the government should
evaluate programming in order to serve the public interest was
initially expressed by the Federal Radio Commission (the FCC's
predecessor).45 In those days, the FRC favored listeners' benefit
over licensee discretion by focusing "first and foremost on the
interest, the convenience, and the necessity of the listening public,
and not on the interest, convenience, or necessity of the individual
broadcaster." 46 In the early days, when there were relatively few
stations on the air, the needs of the listening public usually meant
having a radio station to listen to at all. Consequently, the
practical impact of the FRC's efforts can be summed up by the
phrase "more is more." Large commercial stations were more
likely to secure licenses than small newcomers or educational
stations because the more powerful the station, the more people
that station would reach.47
In the 1950s, the FCC began gathering data pertaining to
structural elements such as acquisition, production, ownership,
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Public Broadcasting Act, PUB. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967).
See Public Television Stations, supra note 42, at 3.
Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (citing FRC ANN. REP. (1928)).
Krattenmaker, supra note 32, at 22 quoting FRC Statement (1928).
Krattenmaker, supra note 32, at 22.
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distribution, sale, licensing and exhibition of programs for
television broadcasting.48 In November 1959, the FCC broadened
the scope of its study to provide a greater focus on whether the
regulations in place at that time provided broadcasters with
sufficient guidance in program selection.49 Several witnesses who
testified at hearings urged the Commission to require licensees to
include certain types of programs." These findings of studies and
hearings were published in the FCC's Report and Statement of
Policy issued in July 1960.
1. Non-entertainmentProgram Guidelines
The Commission issued its first major policy statement on
programming in 1946, known as the "Blue Book."'" The Blue
Book was meant to offer broadcasters guidance as to how to
provide well-balanced programming and illustrated the FCC's
attempt to balance program evaluation with licensees' discretion in
selecting programs. 2 Because there was little caselaw on this
issue, and because the Blue Book did not impose specific criteria
pertaining to amounts or types of programming, broadcasters were
unclear as to how the FCC expected them to fulfill their duty to
their broadcast communities. 3
The Commission attempted to resolve the confusion by
elaborating on programming guidelines in the 1960 Policy

48. Network Programming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291 (July 29, 1960).
49. Id. at7291.
50. Id.at 7293.
51. 1946 Report on Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees
("Blue Book"). Interestingly, the Blue Book was never published in the

Commission's reporter.
52. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 at Appendix E,para. 2 quoting
the Blue Book. "The Commission has given explicit and repeated recognition to

the need for adequate reflection in programs of local interest, activities and
talent... [the] primary responsibility for the American system of broadcasting
rests with the licensees of broadcast stations." Id.
53. See id.
at Appendix E, para. 4.
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Statement. 4 While the Commission did not want to adopt rigid
program requirements, the Report listed fourteen elements it felt
were required to meet the public interest and would be considered
in future applications:
(1) Opportunity for local self-expression, (2)
Development and Use of Local Talent, (3)
Programs for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5)
Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs,
(7) Editorialization by Licensees, (8) Political
Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10) News
Programs, (11) Weather and Markets Reports, (12)
Sports Programs, (13) Service to Minority Groups
and (14) Entertainment Programming.55
Although specific types and amounts of programming were not
required, the FCC considered applicants' showings of how they
satisfied (or planned to satisfy) the needs of their local broadcast
communities.
Mutually exclusive license applications became very detailoriented as applicants tried to show the FCC their program
proposals best served the community. From looking at FCC
decisions, it is easy to imagine the time and cost put into such
efforts. In a mutually exclusive application for stations to be
located in Newport News or Smithfield, Virginia,56 each applicant
submitted detailed program information and evidence of
discussion with community leaders. 7 Each applicant provided a
breakdown of programming into about 20 categories,58 along with
the percentage of on-air time that would be devoted to each
category. For example, one applicant planned to devote 10.2% of

54. See Inquiry, supra note 48, at 7291.
55. Id. at 7295.
56. Applications of the Tidewater Broadcasting Co., Inc, Smithfield, VA;
Edwin R. Fischer, Newport News, VA. For Construction Permits, 2 F.C.C.2d
268 (1961). The applicants were not proposing to build stations in the same
location, but in two locations where interference would be too great to support
two stations, therefore only one of the two proposed stations could be built.
57. Id. at 386, 392-93.
58. Id. at 387, 393.
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broadcast time for news, and the other proposed to devote 10.5%
for news. 9 The FCC looked at each category of programming, the
name and description of each program that would be broadcast,
and whose needs the program would satisfy (for example, religious
programs of one applicant were intended to meet the needs of
people in Tidewater, Virginia, west of the James River).6"
The FCC has never issued a non-entertainment requirement per
se, but depending on how much non-entertainment programming
an applicant proposed, the FCC would review the application
differently.61 For example, if a commercial FM license proposal
contained less than 5% local programming and 5% news and
public affairs programming, the application was subject to review
by the full Commission as opposed to staff.62 But, the Commission
did not "identify a quantity... of programming below which no
application will be granted and above which all applications will
be granted."63 The Commission eliminated this guideline in 1981
during deregulation proceedings because it felt that broadcasters'
duty to inform citizens about local issues affecting them could be
achieved without the guideline.'M
B. StructuralRegulations
Structural rules are meant to indirectly promote localism by
regulating non-content aspects of broadcasting such as ownership,
management, staff, geographic location, equipment and the
processes used to select programming. These regulations are
based on the idea that locally owned stations and locally produced
programs are more likely to be responsive to local needs. This
section will discuss several of these rules: the preference for
integration of station ownership and management, the main studio
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Amendment to Section 0.281 of the Commission's
Delegations of Authority to the Chief, Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 491 (1976).

Rules:

62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See Deregulation, supra note 52, at 977.
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rule, media ownership controls and the ascertainment process.
1. Integration of Ownership and Management
The FCC used to award a preference, or extra application points,
to license applicants whose owners promised to integrate
management and ownership of a station.65 That is, station owners
who also promised to manage the station's day-to-day affairs could
secure extra points for integration. At first, this preference was
used only as a tie breaker in mutually exclusive license
applications.66 Eventually though, the integration proposal became
a crucial part of all license applications.67 The FCC measured
owner-manager integration by using quantitative formula that
could be enhanced by qualitative factors, such as an owner's
participation in civic organizations or residence within the service
area.68 The applicant who had a higher integration score would be
awarded the preference.
The Commission's rationale for the integration preference was
three-fold.69 First, the FCC felt that an owner-manager's direct,
day-to-day involvement in the station would give the ownermanager a greater incentive to respond to community needs.7"
Second, the FCC assumed an owner-manager would have a greater
65. Mutually exclusive license applications used to be awarded based on the
comparative hearings process, in which the FCC would review proposals
submitted by the applicants and award points for various criteria such as
Today, mutually exclusive
integration of ownership and management.
broadcast license applications are resolved by auction. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3571
(2004) (AM radio applicants); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3573 (2004) (FM radio
applicants); 47 C.F.R. § 5002 (2004) (noncommercial educational broadcast
applicants).
66. This preference was initially used as a tiebreaker in close cases. Bechtel
v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993) citing Homer Rodeheaver, 12 F.C.C. 301
(1947).
67. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d

393, 396 (1965).
68. Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 882.
69. Id. at 878.
70. Id.
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interest than an absentee owner in seeing the station perform well,
and this increased interest would help ensure superior
performance. 7 ' Third, owner-managers would be in a better
position than absentee owners to get information and feedback
about how well the station meets community needs.7
The integration score eventually became so decisive in the
application process that an applicant could not obtain a license
without winning the integration preference. In other words, the
integration preference became a requirement. Susan M. Bechtel,
one of four applicants for a license to build a new FM station in
Delaware, did not include an integration proposal in her
application.74 When the FCC rejected her application, she
challenged the requirement on the grounds that it was arbitrary and
capricious. The D.C. Circuit agreed, and invalidated the
integration requirement in 1993.75
The D.C. Circuit found that the integration requirement was
arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. First, the Court found
that the Commission "appears to have no evidence that the
preferred structure even survives among the winners (who could
turn around and sell their licenses after one year without requiring
the buyer to integrate), much less that it does so among especially
outstanding broadcasters."76
In addition, the Court found that the FCC's quantitative formula
yielded results that conflicted with the Commission's policy
justifications for integration.77 While an applicant with a low
integration score could recoup some points for qualitative factors
such as civic participation, these factors were worth much less in

71. Id. at 879.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 875 citing Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. F.C.C., 598 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Comm. for Cmty. Access v. F.C.C., 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Anchor Broad. Ltd. P'ship, 4 F.C.C.R. 5687 (ALJ 1989), aff'd 5 F.C.C.R. 2432
(Rev. Bd. 1990).
74. Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 877.
75. Id. at 887.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 882.
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the point scheme than the raw integration score. For example,
suppose there were two applicants competing for one license.
Applicant A's owner is unfamiliar with the community, has little
experience in the broadcasting industry, but proposes to devote 40
hours per week as a manager. Applicant B's owner, on the other
hand, is a longtime resident of the community, has broadcast
experience, but plans to devote only 30 hours per week to
management of the station. Under the quantitative formula, the
FCC would award the integration preference to Applicant A. The
points for qualitative factors such as community residence and
broadcast experience would not be sufficient for a part-time
owner-manager like Applicant B's owner to override Applicant
A's proposed full-time owner-manager integration proposal.
The idea that radio station owners who also acted as station
managers would be more sensitive to community needs is not an
unreasonable one. But, because the FCC's formula placed so
much weight on number of hours owners spent as managers, and
because the proposal did not guarantee that future owners would
do the same, the Court found it was an arbitrary and capricious
way to evaluate applications.78 The Court also found other reasons
to invalidate the integration preference, which will be discussed in
Part III.
2. Main Studio Rule
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the FCC adopted rules related
to program origination and community accessibility to the station,
which became known as the "main studio rule."79 This rule
focused on broadcasters' geographic proximity to their
communities. The main studio rule required broadcasters to
maintain studios accessible to the public (in terms of physical
location within close proximity to the community) with sufficient
equipment to produce and broadcast programming.8" The FCC felt
78. Id. at 879, 882.
79. 47 C.F.R. 73.1125 (2004).

80. Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the Commission's
Rules, the Main Studio and Program Origination Rules for Radio and Television
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that "a station cannot serve as a medium for local self expression
unless it provides a reasonably accessible studio for the origination
of local programs."'" Accessibility to the community would
ensure station participation in community activities and make it
easy for listeners to offer suggestions or complaints to the station.82
The Commission felt that the requirement would ensure fulfillment
of broadcasters' local service obligations:
As the main studio played the key role in the
origination of a broadcast station's programming,
its location in the community would assure the use
of local talent and ideas.. .A local main studio
would also permit community residents to readily
contact the station to voice suggestions or
complaints. Further, the location of a station's main
studio in the community of license would ensure
the station's integration in the activities of the
community it is primarily licensed to serve. This
interaction would foster responsive programming.83
In other words, broadcasters were more likely to produce
community-oriented programming if they, were required to
produce some of their programs locally. This rule remained intact
without changes for about 30 years.
In 1987, the FCC revised the main studio rule by eliminating the
program origination requirement.84 The Commission felt it could
no longer justify a rule based on the assumption that locallyproduced programs were likely to be locally-oriented or feature
local talent.8" In addition, the FCC found that improvements in
technology made it possible for broadcasters to originate
programming from virtually anywhere; consequently, it became
too costly for broadcasters to originate programming from their
Broadcast Stations, 2 F.C.C. 3215 (1987).
81. Id. quoting Promulgation of Rules and Regulations Concerning the
Origination Point of Programs, 43 F.C.C. 570, 571 (1950).
82. Id. citing Television Main Studio Location, 43 F.C.C. 888, 890 (1952).
83. Id. at 3217-18.
84. Id. at 3218.
85. Id.
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main studio.86 However, the Commission decided not to do away
with the main studio rule altogether." Instead, it gave broadcasters
more flexibility in choosing the physical location of the main
Even though it repealed the program origination
studio."
requirement, stations were still required to maintain program
production and transmission equipment at the studio.
Critics argue that the current version of the main studio rule no
longer serves its purpose in preserving localism and should
therefore be repealed altogether.
The current rule requires
broadcasters to maintain a main studio equipped with program and
production facilities, capable of continuous program transmission
and with meaningful management and staff presence, as well as a
toll-free phone number.9" The Commission elaborated upon the
definition of "meaningful staff and management presence" in 1991
when it said, "We believe that a meaningful presence means more
than one full-time clerical person, together with occasional
oversight from two management personnel who apparently have
no specific work schedule [at the studio] but instead, work at the
studio at irregular intervals, aggregating six hours per week."9
Thus, the appropriate combination of management and staff
presence at the main studio is unclear.
Critics argue the FCC should repeal the main studio rule in its
entirety because it no longer serves its purpose of promoting
localism.
They argue that it makes little sense to require
broadcasters to maintain production equipment when they are no
86. Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the Commission's
Rules, the Main Studio and Program Origination Rules for Radio and Television
Broadcast Stations, 2 F.C.C.R. at 3218.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the Commission's
Rules, the Main Studio and Program Origination Rules for Radio and Television
Broadcast Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 5024, 5026 (1988).
90. Id.
91. Application for Review of Jones Eastern of the Outer Banks, Inc.
Licensee, Radio Station WRSF(FM) Columbia, North Carolina, 6 F.C.C.R.
3615, 3616 (1991).
92. See Silverman, supra note 29, at 492.
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longer required to produce any programming locally.93 In addition,
critics note that localism is not served because broadcasters are no
longer required to keep main studios in close proximity to their
local communities.94 They conclude that because the rule no
longer serves its original purpose of enhancing localism, it no
95
longer makes sense for the Commission to impose it.
The next section discusses ascertainment, an information-getting
process broadcasters were required to perform in order to get their
licenses. Although the ascertainment rules did not focus on
stations' physical or staffing structures, they are included in the
structural discussion because they were another mechanism
designed to indirectly achieve localism.
3. Ascertainment
Like structural rules such as owner-manager integration and the
main studio requirements, the ascertainment rules were meant to
achieve localism indirectly.
The FCC implemented the
ascertainment rules as a tool to help broadcasters determine what
their local community's needs were, and thereby place
broadcasters in a better position to respond to those needs.96 The
ascertainment rules required broadcasters to study local
community problems and population demographics under the
assumption that licensees who studied their communities were
more likely to tailor programs to their local communities.
Ascertainment refers to a process of information gathering that
broadcasters were required to conduct in order to obtain or renew a
license.
Applicants were required to study community
demographics, survey the public, interview community leaders and
keep program logs.
In 1971, the FCC issued a Primer on Ascertainment97 that
93. Id. at 493, 495.
94. Id. at 493.
95. Id.

96. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d
1076, para. 45 (1984).
97. Primer on Ascertainment

of Community
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described in more detail what the FCC expected from new license
applicants in order to fulfill these criteria. There were two parts to
ascertainment of community problems: consultations with
community leaders and consultations with the general public. The
first component of the ascertainment process was a study of
community demographics. The applicant had to collect current
data showing the ethnic, racial and economic breakdown of the
community, as well as presence of public service organizations
and any other distinctive features in the community.98 The FCC
allowed applicants discretion in this process - they could use data
from the U.S. Census Bureau or employ someone to survey a
random sample of the community.99
Once an applicant identified community issues by reviewing the
surveys and demographic information, the applicant had to
interview community leaders about these problems. Applicants
were directed to "choose members from each of those broad
groups that reflect the composition of the city of license"'00 and
interview them in person. Interestingly, the FCC required the
station owner or high-level manager (as opposed to staff members)
to conduct these in-person interviews with community leaders.'
The rationale behind requiring high-level members to conduct the
interviews was to prevent the filtering of information that could
occur if staff members conducted interviews and relayed the
results to management. The Commission also reasoned, "[T]he
person-to-person interview with management of the station is more
likely to establish a contact with the station in the interviewee's
mind" so the leader "knows someone to call if he believes there
01 2
are matters that warrant further discussion."'
Renewal commercial broadcast applicants, public television and
public radio licensees were also subject to ascertainment
requirements, but the requirements for these licensees were more
Applicants, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
98. Id.

99. Id. at 660.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 664.
102. See id.
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relaxed than those required for new applications." 3 Commercial
renewal licensees were exempt from the community demographic
surveys. °4 Although they still had to interview community
leaders, the Commission supplied applicants with a list of
"structural and institutional elements""1 5 common to most
communities and directed applicants to interview leaders
associated with the listed "elements" or organizations." °6 Public
television and radio stations were also subject to ascertainment
requirements, including compiling annual reports, documenting
community problems and records of programming during the year
that addressed those problems." 7 All of the annual reports would
be made available to the public and were to be included as part of
the licensee's next renewal application. 8
Although there is merit in the idea that broadcasters can serve
their local communities better if they understand who their
communities are, the ascertainment process turned out to be too
burdensome to be practical. Ascertainment was burdensome for
license applicants in terms of time and money it took to conduct
in-person interviews, survey the public and discern community
problems. 9 Ascertainment was also burdensome to the FCC, who
was forced to get involved in the minutiae of applicants'
ascertainments in order to resolve opponents' challenges to their
completeness or accuracy. Sometimes, the FCC denied licenses or

103. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1976); Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Noncommercial Educational Broadcast Applicants, Report and Order, 58
F.C.C.2d 526 (1976).
104. Ascertainment by Broadcast Applicants, supra note 103.
105. Id. at 419.
106. Id.
107. Ascertainment by Noncommercial Educational Broadcast Applicants,
supra note 103.
108. Id.
109. Revision of Program Policies and Reporting Requirements Related to
Public Broadcasting Licensees, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 746, 752 (1984).
According to commentators, the ascertainment process cost licensees up to
$13,000 per year. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/5

20

2004]

Martens: Restoring
LocalismLOCALISM
to Broadcast Communications
RESTORING

305

issued demerits for insufficient ascertainment.' ° For example, an
applicant for a license in Corpus Christi, Texas presented the
Commission one page of the U.S. Census as its ascertainment of
community make-up."' The FCC found it significant that the
applicant failed to include information to reflect the fact that one in
five of the families in the area lived under the poverty level." 2 The
applicant eventually produced more detailed but outdated
information and the FCC found that the improper ascertainment3
was a significant defect that justified denying the application."
After several years of licensees repeatedly calling upon the
Commission to evaluate the factual sufficiency of opponents'
ascertainment, and receiving many comments and complaints
about the process, the FCC eliminated the formal ascertainment
requirements for radio in 1981 and television in 1984.114
The next section will discuss ownership limits, which are meant
to govern the structure of the broadcast industry as a whole.
Although the Commission adopted and modified the above
structural rules and ownership rules at different times and for
different reasons, the effect of relaxation of these structural rules
compounds the problems caused by media consolidation.

110. See Application of Northwest Indiana Broadcasting Corporation for
Renewal License of Station WLTH, Gary, Indiana, 57 F.C.C.2d 686 (1975)
(challenger alleged misrepresentation of facts and conducted inadequate public
survey); Application of Pillar of Fire For Renewal of License of Station
WAWZ-FM Zarephath, New Jersey; Radio New Jersey Somerville, New Jersey;
For Construction Permit, 99 F.C.C.2d 1256, 1260 (1984) (challenger calling
opponent's ascertainment efforts "perfunctory and cynical"); Applications of
Vacationland Broadcasting Company, Inc. (WFTM-TV) Ft. Walton Beach,
Florida for Construction Permit, et. al, 97 F.C.C.2d 485, 497 (1984) (applicant
issued demerits for ascertainment misrepresentation).
111. Application of A.V. Bamford, Corpus Christi, Texas for Construction
Permit, 60 F.C.C.2d 749, 750 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 754.
114. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 993 (1984); Revision of
Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, para. 47
(1984).
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4. Ownership Restrictions
The structural regulations that have impacted localism in
broadcasting the most over the last few years are the changes in
ownership rules. These rules govern the structure of the entire
industry as opposed to rules aimed at the structure of individual
licensees, such as integration and the main studio rule. Like the
other structural rules, ownership restrictions promote localism
indirectly. Restricting ownership of broadcast stations preserves
broadcast diversity within local communities so one voice does not
prevail over all others. Before discussing the history of ownership
regulations, it is helpful to briefly identify various types of media
rules as well as the FCC's definition of "market" for purposes of
measuring competition.
Ownership caps limit consolidation by limiting the number of
radio or television stations owned by a single owner either
nationwide or within a local market. Audience caps restrict
common ownership to a percentage of the national audience that
one owner's broadcast stations reach. Cross-media rules restrict or
prohibit common ownership of different forms of media within a
local market. Historically, the FCC has defined markets based on
a measurement which focused on stations' overlapping contours." 5
This method of market definition often resulted in multiple
markets within the same metropolitan area." 6 In 2003, the FCC
modified its definition of market to be more in line with how
economists would define a broadcast market by taking into
account entire metropolitan areas together and including
noncommercial stations.'

The FCC's first media ownership restrictions limited media
companies' power on a national level; restrictions within local
markets came later as the FCC's analysis of markets and
competition became more sophisticated. The FCC's goal in
promulgating these rules has always been to promote competition

115. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13717.
116. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13718.
117. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13717.
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while restricting undue market concentration to ensure that a
variety of voices would be heard.'18 The next subsections
summarize the history of each of these restrictions up to the 1996
Act. The ramifications of the 1996 Act and subsequent biennial
reviews pursuant to the 1996 Act drastically changed the broadcast
industry and will be addressed separately.
i. Ownership Caps
The first multiple ownership rule prevented FM radio station
owners from owning more than six stations in order to "obviate
possible monopoly, and encourage local initiative.""' 9 Similar
rules for television and AM radio were also adopted in the 1940s
and early 1950s.' 2 ° In 1946, the FCC set a defacto limit of seven
stations when it denied CBS' application for an eighth station.'2 '
This rule was later formally adopted by the FCC as the "Seven
Station Rule" or the "Rule of Seven" in which a common owner
could have ownership interests in seven FM, seven AM and seven
TV stations (of which up to five could be VHF stations).'22 The
Rule of Seven remained intact without modification for nearly
thirty years. After this long, stable period, the FCC began to make
118. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13639.
119. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 100
F.C.C.2d 17, 21 (1984) quoting Rules Governing High Frequency Broadcast
Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940).
120. Id. citing Federal Communications Commission, Seventh Annual
Report, 34 (FY 1941) (1941) (limiting TV stations under common ownership to
three); See Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and
Regulations Relating to the Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcasting Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) (adopting ownership limit on AM

stations).
121. Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership
Caps: More Monopolies, Less Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of
Equal Protection,5 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 269, 270 (1997) citing Sherwood
B. Brunton, 11 F.C.C. 407 (1946).
122. Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and
Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcasting Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
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series of decisions easing the ownership restrictions to allow more
consolidation.
The Commission began to shift its focus from national caps to
competition and concentration in local markets: "the more correct
focus for... diversity and economic competition... is the number
and variety of information and advertising outlets in local markets,
a matter that is not addressed by a nationwide restriction on
'
ownership."123
The Commission lifted the station cap from seven
to twelve stations in 1984 with the intent to eventually eliminate it
altogether.'24 The FCC felt this action was justified because there
were many more television and radio stations (especially FM)
operating in 1984 than when the Seven Station Rule was adopted
1953. In addition, most of the television stations had affiliation
agreements with one of the three large networks anyway, so a cap
would have limited impact. 125
The FCC also accepted
broadcasters' arguments that relaxation of the station ownership
cap would allow groups to build base stations in large markets that
would support creation of new programs that would compete with
large networks and provide consumers a greater range of viewing
choices." 6 In 1991, the Commission initiated a rulemaking to
reconsider radio ownership caps'2 7 and ultimately decided to raise
the radio station cap to twenty AM and twenty FM stations, while
the television cap remained at twelve.'28

123. Amendment of Section 73.3555, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 20
(1984).
124. Id. The FCC at the time did not feel that lifting the ban would harm the
broadcasting industry, but many commentators were fearful of significant and
harmful consolidation that would result from lifting the ban, so the FCC raised
the cap to twelve stations for the following six years. Id.
125. Id. at 26-27.
126. Id. at 36.
127. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
6 F.C.C.R. 3275 (1991).
128. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Second Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, 7184 (1994).
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ii. Audience Cap

The Commission's efforts to balance the benefits of group
ownership against the risk of undue concentration in the television
broadcasting led it to add a restriction in the form of an audience
cap. When the Commission set the television common ownership
limit to twelve stations in 1985, it also limited television
29
broadcasters' audience reach to 25% of the national audience.
The Commission felt that this audience cap would prevent already
large multiple station owners from acquiring more stations without
prohibiting small multiple owners the opportunity to expand their
reach. 30
'
An interesting quirk to the audience cap rule is the UHF
discount. The UHF discount refers to the way the FCC counts the
number of homes reached by one UHF station owner. UHF
stations, the high-numbered stations on the proverbial television
"dial," provide a significantly weaker signal than the VHF stations
(the lower numbers on the "dial") where the three main networks
are located. To compensate UHF owners for their weaker signals,
the FCC discounts their audience reach by 50%.'
Thus,
broadcasters could theoretically reach over 25% of households
when factoring in the discount for UHF stations. This discount
based on signal strength is logical, but the discount also undercuts
the Commission's policy to prevent undue concentration by
permitting broadcasters with UHF stations to exceed the cap.
iii. Duopoly Cross-MediaOwnership Rules
Duopoly and cross-media rules focus on localized markets rather
than the numerical limits or audience cap, which apply on the
national level. Until the early 1990s, the FCC entirely prohibited
duopolies, or common ownership of multiple AM or FM stations
129. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, 76 (1985).
130. Id. at 87.
131. Id. at 93.
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in the same market. 132 The Commission began to ease these
restrictions as it attempted to help an ailing radio industry by
appropriately draft these rules according to the size of a given
market. In 1991, the FCC allowed one person to own up to four
same service stations in the same market, as long as the owner did
not reach more than 25% of the market's audience.' 33 These
relaxed duopoly rules for radio did not change until passage of the
1996 Act.
In 1970, the FCC adopted its prohibition of cross-media
ownership, which prevents ownership of different media services
within the same market.'3 4 These rules were in effect until passage
of the 1996 Act.
iv. Deregulation
There were two waves of deregulation in broadcasting: the first
in the 1980s and the second after passage of the 1996
Telecommunications Act. The FCC Commissioners during the
Reagan administration received many complaints from
broadcasters who felt the FCC imposed too many limitations on
broadcasters and that compliance was too expensive.135 They
urged the Commission to leave issues of programming, localism
and competition to discretion of licensees and to market forces.' 36
The Commissioners agreed and repealed ascertainment rules,
program log requirements and nonentertainment programming
review rules. Eventually, the D.C. Circuit Court also invalidated
the owner-manager integration preference in 1993.137

132. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
2755, 2761 (1992).
133. Id. at Table 1, Appendix D.
134. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Stations,
First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970).
135. See Revision of Program Policies and Reporting Requirements Related
to Public Broadcasting Licensees, 98 F.C.C.2d 746, 751 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Bechtel, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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The second wave of media deregulation occurred after passage
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, when Congress relaxed
many forms of ownership restrictions. To briefly summarize, the
ownership restrictions in place just before passage of the 1996 Act
were: one owner could own up to forty radio stations or twelve
radio stations nationwide; commonly owned television stations
could reach up to 25% of the national audience; commonly owned
radio stations within the same local market could not reach up to
25% of the local audience; no common ownership of radio and
television stations within a local market was permitted.
The 1996 Act completely changed the broadcasting industry. In
radio, the 1996 Act lifted the numerical station cap and allowed a
person to control multiple radio stations in a local market,
depending on the size of the local market.'38 In the smallest
markets, one person could not control more than half of the
market's AM or FM stations. 39 However, the FCC's definition of
"market" provided a loophole for radio station owners who wanted
to own multiple stations in the same area. The Commission's
definition of market was based upon overlapping broadcast
signals, and did not at all reflect what most people would consider
a competitive market.'
Under this approach, it was possible for
one metropolitan area to be counted as several distinct markets. 4 '
This definition of market allowed large group owners to own well
over half of all radio stations in areas like Mansfield, Ohio, where
one company owns 11 of 17 local radio stations. 42
Without a cap on the number of commonly owned stations, the
1996 Act cleared the way for Clear Channel to own 1,200 radio
stations. This degree of common ownership makes economies of
scale appealing - large group owners today engage in costminimizing practices like voicetracking and pre-recorded call-ins
for dozens of stations.'43 In essence, the 1996 Act permitted group
138. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 3.
139. Id.
140. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.

141. See id.
142. See Dunbar, supra note 13.
143. See Polakow-Suransky, supra note 4, at 39.
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owners to franchise radio by offering an identical, recognizable
product in mass quantities across the United States. Thus, the
1996 Act took a broadcast service designed to serve the unique
needs of a community and turned it into "McRadio." In addition,
without any of the other structural or content rules in effect to
provide a check on group owners' programming practices, the
radio consolidation process moved rapidly.
In the 1996 Act's revisions for television, Congress eliminated
the numerical station ownership cap, relaxed local ownership rules
and raised the national audience cap from 25% to 35%. 44' While
these changes have not reduced the number of available television
channels or reduced viewing choice, most of what we watch on
television is controlled by a handful of large media companies and
networks such as Viacom, Fox, ABC and NBC.
In the years following the 1996 Act, the broadcasting industry
changed considerably. In addition to media consolidation, the
advent of the internet, satellite television and enhanced cable
television services exponentially increased one's ability to access
information, news and entertainment. The FCC, citing increased
source diversity and competition, promulgated controversial
amendments to the 1996 Act in June 2003 in favor of further
media consolidation. In 2003, the Commission raised the national
television audience cap from 35% to 45%, so that one owner can
reach nearly half of American television households. 145 The
Commission also adopted a new local television ownership rule
that allows common ownership of TV stations in the same market,
depending upon the size of the market and station ratings. 146 In
radio, the Commission retained the ownership limits in local
markets, but implemented a new definition of "market" that
47
includes entire metropolitan areas and noncommercial stations.1
In other words, the former awkward definition of market was
dropped in favor of a definition more in line with the way
economists define competitive markets. Although these changes
144.
145.
146.
147.

1996 Act, § 202(c).
See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13815.
See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13668.
See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13717.
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in radio will probably limit future consolidation, the Commission
did not require any owners to sell off any stations in order to
comply with the new definition of "market," so any impact upon
present levels of consolidation will remain unchanged. 48 In the
meantime, however, no television or radio station owners were
forced to sell off any stations in order to comply with the new
rules, so the current climate in broadcasting is likely to continue
indefinitely.
II. SOLUTIONS

After many years of experimenting with regulatory tools aimed
at making broadcasters more responsive to their communities, it
looks as though the FCC ultimately decided to deregulate, cross its
fingers and hope for the best. Although the FCC consistently
reaffirms the importance of localism as a policy goal, 149 its actions
in eliminating virtually all the rules that were designed to promote
localism severely undercut any commitment to localism.
In heavily populated urban areas, it is easier to achieve media
diversity and community responsiveness because the broadcasting
and advertising pool is diverse enough to serve various community
needs. However, current trends in media consolidation will lead to
less diversity over the airwaves, which will be particularly
problematic in mid-sized cities and smaller areas where there are
fewer broadcasters. 5 ' Possible solutions to the increasing lack of
localism in broadcasting include reexamining past structural and
content rules, but my primary focus will be on enhancement of the
LPFM (Low-Power FM) service.
A. Revisiting Content Regulations
One way the FCC could increase content localism in radio
would be to require radio stations to dedicate a percentage of

148. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13808.
149. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2, at 13643.
150. See Dunbar, supra note 13.
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airtime to local news or cultural programming. On one hand, this
kind of requirement would be a new and radical change in radio
regulation because the FCC has never required specific quantities
of a particular type of programming. On the other hand, this kind
of requirement is not without precedent; the FCC clearly has the
authority to regulate program content including indecency,
obscenity and children's programming."'
The FCC could require broadcasters to devote a given
percentage of broadcast time on a daily or weekly basis to locallyoriented programming. Although the amount of programming is
fixed in this kind of rule, a broad definition of "local content" that
included news, cultural affairs and events, political and historical
issues would leave wide discretion to program choice to the
licensee. A flat percentage rule would be useful because it would
be easy for licensees to understand and the least burdensome for
the FCC to enforce, unlike the complicated processes surrounding
the ascertainment rules. The rule could be written so that it applies
only to stations owned by large group owners, or to stations
serving small- to medium-sized markets, where the lack of
localism in broadcasting is most pronounced.'52
Instead of
reviewing program logs and complicated proposals, the
Commission could enforce a local content rule by investigating
complaints and levying fines, in the same way it regulates
indecency. Admittedly, this type of rule is not a perfect solution,
but it would help keep broadcasters in touch with their local
service communities.
A local content rule would be a better way to achieve localism
than the program-origination rule or the non-entertainment
program review procedures. A local content requirement would
achieve localism as a direct result of the rule, unlike the indirect
nature of the program-origination and non-entertainment rules. A
151. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4165 (Indecent broadcasts), 73.4170 (Obscene
broadcasts); Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices,
Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984); Action for Children's Television v.
F.C.C., 756 F.2d 899 (1985) (holding that Commission had authority to regulate
children's television programming).
152. See generally Dunbar, supra note 13.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/5

30

2004]

Martens: Restoring Localism to Broadcast Communications

RESTORING LOCALISM

315

local content rule would also be preferable to the nonentertainment programming guidelines because those rules served
only as delegation guidelines advising broadcasters how the
Commission would review license applications.'53 A local content
rule would go several steps further than the non-entertainment and
program-origination rules in achieving localism by requiring a
given amount of a locally-oriented programming to be broadcast
over the airways. The only potential shortcoming of this type of
rule is that it would not guarantee the quality of the locallyoriented programming.
B. Reexamination of StructuralRules
Historically, the structural rules imposed by the FCC were either
repealed or radically modified, such as the main studio rule, the
integration preference and ownership rules.154 The Commission's
assumption about these regulations was that local production or
ownership resulted in more programming focused on local
issues."' This logic is rational, but the FCC did not have findings
to support these conclusions so the rules based on that assumption
were often repealed or invalidated.'56 The FCC could not show
that locally-owned or -operated stations, or that locally-produced
programming
necessarily
resulted
in
locally-oriented
programming.'57 Today, however, the FCC could justify these
types of rules by showing that absentee group owners who use
techniques such as voicetracking are unlikely to produce locally
responsive programming. In light of this new spin on an old
theory, previous structural rules are worth revisiting.
1. Owner-ManagerIntegration
In order to achieve greater structural localism, the FCC could
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See generally Dunbar, supra note 13
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part LI.
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adopt a new integration rule by requiring licensees to either
integrate their owners and management, or possess previous civic
involvement in the community and local residence. Bechtel does
not stand for the proposition that the FCC cannot impose some
form of integration between station owners and managers. Rather,
the Court held the integration rule in Bechtel arbitrary and
capricious because the rule was promulgated without factual
findings and because the FCC's mathematical formula yielded
58
unjust results.1
The FCC could promulgate a new integration rule if it could
show that owners who do not participate in station management
are more likely to be unresponsive to the community in their
programming. Although rulemaking and comment procedures are
more onerous than implementing policy statements, courts defer to
59
an agency's findings adopted through a rulemaking proceeding.1
However, a new integration rule is likely to be impractical and
unsuccessful. First, even if the FCC successfully promulgated a
new integration rule, group owners own too many stations to be
expected to be personally involved in managing any of them.
Consequently, the rule would be probably be drafted to exempt
those owners who already under-serve their local communities. In
that situation, the burden of compliance would disproportionately
and unfairly fall upon small station owners, who not only have
limited human and capital resources to pay for compliance, but
should not be the primary target of a new integration rule. Instead,
a new rule clarifying station staff requirements would be easier for
the FCC to apply and achieve localism more effectively than an
integration requirement.
2. Main Studio Staffing Requirements
The Commission should continue to require licensees to
maintain "meaningful management and staff presence""16 at their
158. Bechtel, 10 F.3d 875.
159. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
160. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/5

32

2004]

Martens: Restoring
Localism to
Broadcast Communications
RESTORING
LOCALISM

317

main studios, but should further clarify the meaning of that term.
This phrase has been interpreted in Jones Eastern to mean that "a
main studio must, at a minimum, maintain full-time managerial
and full-time staff personnel."'' However, this definition does not
give broadcasters adequate direction as to staffing requirements. It
makes sense to keep the staffing requirement so someone will be at
the studio to respond to community needs or even emergencies,
such as the 2001 train accident in Minot, North Dakota. The
Commission could make this requirement meaningful by defining
it clearly. Like a local content rule, the Commission could enforce
the rule by investigating complaints and imposing fines.

C. Expand Low Power FM
The most effective way to promote content and structural
localism is for the Commission and Congress to expand the LPFM
service created in 2000162 by easing the interference requirements
and allowing some stations to be commercial. LPFM stations use
the same band as full-power FM stations, but their signals reach
only a few blocks or a couple of miles. The thought behind
creating an LPFM service was that these small stations would be
inherently local, and could serve traditionally underserved groups
such as racial and ethnic minorities, or an entire neighborhood.' 63
Low-power service is ideal for these purposes because the stations
64
cost as little as $6,000 to build $500 per month to operate.'
The FCC and most commenters agreed that all the LPFM
stations should be licensed for noncommercial use because they
161. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, supra note
67, at 3616.
162. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, First Report and Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000).

163. Creation of a Low Power Radio Service, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 2471 (1999).

164. Kevin Y. Kim, The Rockland Radio Revolution: A Small-town Station
in Maine is Proofthat Low-Power Radio Builds Community, THE NATION, Nov.
17, 2003, at 22.
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felt that commercial stations' goals in maximizing audience size
and advertising revenue would hinder their responsiveness to the
community.'65 The FCC found that "noncommercial licensees,
which are not subject to commercial imperatives to maximize
audience size, are more likely than commercial licensees to serve
small, local groups with particular shared needs and interests, such
as linguistic and cultural minorities or groups with shared civic or
educational interests that may now be underserved by advertisersupported commercial radio and higher powered noncommercial
radio stations.' 66
An example of what the Commission envisioned LPFM to be is
WRFR, an LPFM station serving Rockland, Maine. WRFR has
about 35 volunteer deejays, who play everything from Native
American rain chants to electronica to James Brown.'6 7 The
station also airs some of Maine's only reporting on the commercial
fishing industry. 168 In addition, WRFR presents its own daily call69
in program with state and local lawmakers.
By lifting the unduly restrictive interference protections placed
upon LPFM stations and allowing limited commercial use,
communities across the country could enjoy community-based
radio such as WRFR in Rockland, Maine.
1.Interference
Potential interference between full-power and LPFM stations is
a legitimate concern for radio broadcasters, and has been a
controversial obstacle in getting LPFM service up and running. 7 °
Initially, after considering engineering studies and comments, the
FCC adopted protection from second-adjacent channel interference
in order to sufficiently protect the signals of existing broadcast
165. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
166. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
167. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
168. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
169. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
170. See Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, Localism
Task Force, RM-10803.
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stations. 1 ' With this level of interference protection, the spectrum
can accommodate about 400 LPFM stations in major metropolitan
areas, and many more elsewhere.7 2
However, Congress
unexpectedly enacted third-adjacent channel protection by tacking
it onto an appropriations bill on December 21, 2000.113 Increasing
the level of interference protection drastically reduced the number
of stations that would be licensed nationwide to 70, all the way to
zero in some areas and 2 or 3 in others.' 74 Congress also directed
the FCC to conduct further interference studies. 175 In order to fully
understand the interference issue, some background information
about interference is useful.
The FCC's interference guidelines are based on broadcast
channels (i.e. 91.5 FM) and the distance between stations. In
general, the closer two stations are to broadcasting on the same
channel, the further apart the stations must be located.'76 For
example, two radio stations that broadcast on the same channel
must be located a certain distance apart from each other. Two
stations broadcasting on the first-adjacent channel to 91.5 (91.4 or
91.6) also have prescribed distance requirements, but the stations
do not need to be as far apart as stations operating on the same
channel. Two stations broadcasting on second-adjacent channels
to 91.5 (91.3 or 91. 7) can be located in closer proximity to each
other than those operating on first-adjacent channels.
Third-adjacent channel protection requires a prospective
171. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 6.
172. Bill McConnell, LPFM OK'd, BROADCAST & CABLE, Jan. 24, 2000, at
22.
173. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553
§ 632, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000).
174. See McConnell, supra note 172, at 22. For example, under the thirdadjacent channel regulations, there is no room for any 100 watt stations in
Chicago, New York and Los Angeles; room for one 100 watt station in
Philadelphia. Id. Instead of the 1,000 LPFM stations envisioned by the
Commission, there would only be room for 70. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
OFF THE RECORD: WHAT MEDIA CORPORATIONS DON'T TELL You ABOUT

THEIR AGENDAS 32 (2000).

175. District of Columbia Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 200 1, § 632.
176. For minimum distance requirements, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.207 (2004).
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licensee to find a place on the spectrum where there are three
unused channels on either side of it, or build a station far enough
away from existing stations. Since the radio spectrum is already
crowded, it is prohibitively difficult to find a space where there are
seven unused channels in a row. Moreover, if the only other way
to comply with the interference rules is locating the station far
enough away from existing stations, LPFM would become an
essentially rural service. Even with these protections, interference
is unpredictable - a broadcaster following the rules there could
still have interference problems due to factors such as signal
strength, atmospheric conditions and the type of material
transmitted or received.'
The Commission protects licensees
against unexpected interference by addressing complaints on a
case-by-case basis.'
Congress should repeal these burdensome requirements because
they are not necessary, nor do they serve in the public interest.
The FCC comprehensively analyzed interference issues during the
rulemaking process,'79 and Congress should defer to its findings. 8 '
The results of the interference study mandated by Congress
reaffirmed the Commission's earlier determinations that thirdadjacent channel protections are unnecessary, and recommended
Congress to eliminate them.' 8 '
Although interference is a
legitimate concern in broadcasting, the current protections have
essentially barred prospective LPFM licensees from obtaining
licenses. Congress has unreasonably defeated the FCC's efforts to
promote localism by "increas[ing] citizens' access to the airwaves"
and providing better service to "very localized communities or
underrepresented groups within communities."
Lifting these
excessive restrictions would help LPFM flourish, especially if
LPFM stations were licensed for commercial use.
177. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, supra note 162, at para. 103.
178. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.810, 73.827.
179. See Notice, supra note 163, at paras. 38-50; see Creation of Low Power
Radio Service, supra note 162, at 73-104.
180. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
181. FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE Low POWER FM INTERFERENCE
TESTING PROGRAM, at 4 (2004).
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2. License LPFMStationsfor Commercial Use
Other than political pressures on Congress and the Commission
by large broadcasting groups, there is no legal or pragmatic reason
why LPFM has to be a strictly noncommercial service. The FCC
could develop an allocation plan where it could have discretion,
based on demand, to license some stations for noncommercial use
and others for commercial use.182 For example, in a city which
could accommodate six LPFM stations, the Commission could
choose to designate one or two of those six for commercial use.
This bifurcated approach would allow the Commission room for
experimentation with commercial low power radio without
compromising the Commission's preference for a noncommercial
low power service.
Licensing LPFM for commercial use would have procompetitive effects by forcing all broadcasters to be more sensitive
to the needs of their broadcast communities. Local businesses
(such as a mom and pop video rental store) which are too small to
advertise on full-power radio, would gain an additional advertising
opportunity with commercial LPFM. Thus, full-power radio
stations and LPFM stations would not compete for advertising
revenue. If full-power and low power stations eventually compete
for listeners, 83 this competition would be healthy for broadcasting
because it would force full-power stations to be more responsive to
community needs and interests. If listeners decided that they
prefer the programming broadcast on their local LPFM stations,
less responsive, group-owned stations would have no choice but to
compete more effectively by providing locally-oriented
programming.
182. The Commission is bound by 47 U.S.C § 3090) to subject mutually
exclusive license applications to a competitive bidding process, while licenses
for noncommercial educational are not subject to bidding pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 397(6).
183. In theory, however, these stations would not compete for listeners
because the Commission envisioned LPFM stations to serve those who are not
served by traditional commercial radio. See Creation of Low Power Radio
Service, supra note 162, at para. 17.
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In addition, commercial LPFM stations could provide affordable
opportunities for new or small broadcasters, who cannot otherwise
compete with large group owners, to enter the competitive market.
REC Networks noted, "There was a time when more and more
licensees had names such as "(City name here) Broadcasting" or
were just in the name of an individual owner. What upsets us now
is when we see licensee's names with words like "investments,"
'
"properties," "acquisition," etc."184
These comments focus on
LPFM as a mechanism to combat the inability of newcomers to
compete with huge corporations such as Clear Channel or Infinity.
LPFM stations, especially commercial stations, could help prevent
or slow continued consolidation in radio by making practices such
as voicetracking and fake call-ins less profitable for large group
Finally, expansion of LPFM, including licensing
owners.
commercial LPFM stations, comports with the FCC's preference
to allow competition to' be governed primarily by free market
forces.185
IV. CONCLUSION

While the FCC claims it values localism in broadcasting, its
actions send the message that satisfying large media companies'
hunger for profits is more important. The Commission turns a
blind eye when identical programming is simultaneously broadcast
over the airwaves of many different cities, whether listeners want
to hear it or not. The Commission has also allowed further media
consolidation despite vigorous protest from many Americans.
The Commission may be reluctant to promulgate new structural
or content localism rules because historically, compliance and
enforcement of these rules were expensive for licensees and timeconsuming for the Commission. Moreover, rules such as formal
ascertainment, integration and program-origination generally did
184. See Comments of The Amherst Alliance, Localism Task Force, RM10803, January 26, 2004; Comments of REC Networks, Localism Task Force,
RM 10803, December 16, 2003.
185. E.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 2; 98 F.C.C.2d at
751.
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not achieve their goal of enhancing broadcasters' responsiveness
to their local communities.
However, the Commission should treat localism as an important
policy consideration in light of the negative effects of
consolidation that has taken place over the past few years. It is
possible for the FCC to implement new rules to effectively achieve
localism without the burdensome side-effects that resulted from
past rules.
For example, listeners would benefit from a
requirement that conglomerate-owned full-power stations dedicate
time each day to local program content in the form of news, local
affairs or cultural programming. However, enhancing LPFM
service by easing interference restrictions and licensing some
stations for commercial use is the most attractive option because
these stations would achieve structural and content localism
simply by virtue of their size and focus on service to small
communities. Thus, burdensome rules requiring particular types
and amount of locally-oriented content or certain structural
components would be unnecessary. Finally, allowing some
experimentation with commercial LPFM stations would enhance
competition by permitting small broadcasters a way to enter the
market and by pushing unresponsive full-power stations to better
tailor their programming to local needs and interests.
Kristine Martens

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

39

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property
Vol. 14,[Vol.
Iss. 2 XIV:
[2016],285
Art. 5
LAW
& ENT.Law,

324

DEPA UL J ART.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/5

40

